Interconnecting Differentiated Networks by Alexandrov, Alexei - University of Rochester
 
 
NET Institute* 
 
www.NETinst.org 
 
 
 
Working Paper #08-07 
 
October 2008 
 
Interconnecting Differentiated Networks 
 
Alexei Alexandrov 
University of Rochester 
 
_ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The Networks, Electronic Commerce, and Telecommunications (“NET”) Institute, 
http://www.NETinst.org, is a non-profit institution devoted to research on network 
industries, electronic commerce, telecommunications, the Internet, “virtual networks” 
comprised of computers that share the same technical standard or operating system, and 
on network issues in general. 
 
 
NET Institute* 
 
www.NETinst.org 
 
 
 
Working Paper #08-07 
 
October 2008 
 
Interconnecting Differentiated Networks 
 
Alexei Alexandrov 
University of Rochester 
 
_ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The Networks, Electronic Commerce, and Telecommunications (“NET”) Institute, 
http://www.NETinst.org, is a non-profit institution devoted to research on network 
industries, electronic commerce, telecommunications, the Internet, “virtual networks” 
comprised of computers that share the same technical standard or operating system, and 
on network issues in general. 
Interconnecting Differentiated Networks
Alexei Alexandrov∗
University of Rochester†
October 14, 2008
Abstract
I examine interconnection decisions of differentiated firms. I find that previous re-
sults that firms never interconnect enough do not hold. In a Hotelling model consumers
may suffer from interconnection, and firms may interconnect when it is not socially op-
timal. The firms interconnect too much when the network effects are steeper - this
makes firms compete much less aggressively after interconnection, raising prices for
consumers and profits for firms. Price and profit rise results holds under quality and
installed base asymmetries, or only some firms in the industry interconnecting. More
dimensions of differentiation make interconnection less attractive.
1 Introduction
Ever since Katz and Shapiro (1985) the prevalent opinion among economists was that private
firms do not interconnect enough from the society’s or the consumers’ points of view. As a
result, most of the public policy on network interconnection is aimed at encouraging firms to
interconnect (see Gandal (2002) for a summary), with network effects-related issues becoming
one of the poster children of market failure1. I show that consumers might suffer from
interconnection of horizontally differentiated products with networks because of a subsequent
price increase. Moreover, firms might interconnect when it is not socially optimal.
∗I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the NET Institute (www.netinst.org) and the Kauffman
Foundation. I would like to thank Daniel F. Spulber for getting me started with the topic. I would like to
thank the participants of Simon Faculty Lunch for their comments on an earlier draft, and the participants
of both Pittsburgh and Milan Econometric Society meetings for commenting on a later version.
†Assistant Professor of Economics and Management, email: Alexei.Alexandrov@Simon.Rochester.edu
1Windows v. Apple OS, QWERTY v. Dvorak, Beta v VHS, the list goes on. See Liebowitz and Margolis
(1994) for one of the few articles holding the opposite view.
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A product is said to have a positive network effect when consumers purchasing it ben-
efit from others purchasing the same product. Products which have positive effects range
from phones (direct externality) to game consoles, see Gandal (2008) for empirical studies
of network effects2. Interconnection between product A and product B means that the con-
sumers who have purchased good A also enjoy the additional benefit when someone buys
good B. For example, a person who has Yahoo Instant Messenger also enjoys the benefits
of Google Talk’s network after the two companies have interconnected their messengers.
Similarly, people buying a Nissan sedan enjoy the indirect benefit of having all the Renault
service facilities at their disposal, since the two car companies share platforms. Instead of
interconnection the reader can think of interoperability or setting some common standard.
I argue throughout the paper that such interconnection can be bad for consumers, because
the demand becomes less elastic after interconnection, allowing firms to compete less aggres-
sively and charge more. Similarily, firms want to interconnect for all the wrong reasons from
the society welfare point of view. Firms sink interconnection costs too often because they
pay interconnection costs to capture some more of the consumer surplus, without creating
enough in return to justify the costs from the social welfare point of view.
Katz and Shapiro’s conclusion is based on the assumption of Cournot competition be-
tween single-product firms with homogeneous products with positive network effects3. In
their model consumers always benefit from interconnection. My model features horizon-
tally differentiated firms which do not face any capacity constraints - standard differentiated
Bertrand a la Hotelling (1929) setup. The only twists on Hotelling are the positive network
effects, and the ability of the firms to interconnect. Sufficiently strong horizontal differentia-
tion makes the common problem of the network effect literature - dealing with expectations
- much easier. Even then, I impose assumptions on the model that do not let one of the firms
take over the whole market. I am interested in examining the incentives to interconnect,
which is not necessary once there is just one firm left.
Without interconnection firms compete for a consumer for two reasons. The first reason
is increasing revenue. The second reason is that capturing this consumer makes the product
more attractive to the all the other consumers. Interconnection gets rid of the second reason,
effectively making the demand curve less elastic, and allowing firms to charge higher prices
2In case of phones or email consumers get direct externality of more people being on the network being
better. In case of the game consoles consumers derive benefits from other people having the same console
indirectly by getting more software in a bigger market. Also there is the direct benefit of being able to
interact with other users online, and the more users there are, the better off each user is. Platforms and
two-sided markets are a related issue, and this paper could have been presented within the two-sided setup.
For a recent paper examining compatibility in a two-sided setting see Miao (2008), in which the author
examines the incentives of a monopolist to provide compatibility in a complementary market
3I refer to firms interconnecting their products as simply firms interconnecting from now on.
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while maintaining the same customer base. The firms interconnect too much when the
network effects are sufficiently steep, the opposite of what we would expect, as steep network
effects imply the social need of having one big network.
The literature is generally concerned with two ways that firms can interconnect. The
first way is mutually agreeing on a common standard, with each firm paying some fixed cost
to interconnect. The second way is someone providing an adapter to let consumers (possibly
imperfectly) enjoy the benefits of having the other network around, with each firm deciding
how much (and to which network) interconnectivity to provide. I examine the first case of
mutual agreement on a standard in this paper4. The underlying assumption throughout the
paper is that the disutility from buying not an ideal good increases faster than the network
effect5. If the assumption is not satisfied, then the network effects dominate, and we have
to worry about one of the standards/platforms prevailing and capturing the whole market
without interconnection. Since I am interested in interconnection, I do not examine these
cases.
The literature on network effects has focused on the settings where the only differentiation
between the products in the market is the number of consumers in each network. However,
in the majority of the competitive network-effects settings (cell phone companies, instant
messengers, social network sites), there is a horizontal brand (or technological standard)
differentiation as well. For some of the examples generally given in the network externalities
literature, a model with two-sided platforms might be a better fit. I consider network
effects to be somewhat of a reduced approach, which lets the researcher focus on particular
details. My goal in this paper is to point out the difference in the intuition and qualitative
results between Cournot and Hotelling type network interconnection under different sets of
circumstances.
The point that interconnection might hurt consumers in the Hotelling-type setup was
first made by Spulber in his (2008a and 2008b) papers, and proposition 1 in the next section
is a generalization of the arguments in the (2008b) paper. The fact that compatibility
decreases elasticity of demand and lets the firms charge higher prices is also documented in
the mix-and-match literature by Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and Economides (1989). The
mix-and-match literature assumes that there are no explicit network effects for consumers or
4For a paper on adapter interconnection with differentiation (vertical in their case), see Garcia and Vergari
(2008). The authors find that with weak network effects market may achieve full compatibility (although
with stronger network effects compatibility is underprovided). Moreover they find that a bigger firm might
want to interconnect just as much as (or more than) a smaller firm, something that I show as well. Including
adapters in my model would probably lead to something akin to endogenous travel cost models like Hendel
and Neiva de Figueiredo (1997), at least in the linear version of my model.
5More rigorously, I require the derivative of the travel costs to be bigger than the derivative of the network
effect function.
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producers, however the ”demand in mix-and-match models exhibits network externalities”6.
Farrell and Saloner (1992) use the spatial setup to study a market where firms can produce
converters for one-way compatibility with the other firm. They find that the availability
of converters might be bad for society overall. While this also sounds like a too much
interconnection can be bad result, this is not actually the case in their setup. The availability
of converters is bad for the society only when without the converters consumers would have
all joined the same network and achieved perfect standardization.
There are several related works in which interconnectionis not the main topic of the
paper. Perhaps the most related one is Suleymanova and Wey (2008) in which the authors
examine Bertrand competition in a market with network effects and heterogeneous switching
costs. The heterogeneous switching costs behave a lot like the heterogeneous ideal points
in Hotelling, and the results also have some similarity. For a small range of parameters,
the authors find the result that with two active firms incompatibility might be better if the
market share of one of them is really high, and so are the switching costs. For another
range of parameters they find that having a monopoly without interconnection is better for
social welfare than a duopoly with interconnection. Grilo et.al (2001) examine horizontally
differentiated competition with network effects, and derive several benchmark results both for
positive and negative network effects. Griva and Vettas (2004) examine both horizontally and
vertically differentiated market with two firms, noting that, ”full compatibility is equivalent
to zero network effects. We find that, generally, the presence of network effects may lead
firms to compete more intensively and their profits to be lower,” which is a claim of this
paper as well, and I show it in more detail in one of the subsections below.
I go on to the next step in the spatial setup - the incentives to relocate. Adopting the
model of d’Aspremont et. al. (1979), with the addition of linear network externalities, I find
that the effect of network externalities is non-monotonic in the position of the two firms.
When the firms are moderate distance away, the network externalities decrease the incentive
to move away, however if the firms are either very far or very close network externalities
increase the incentive to move away.
In a latter section I examine a model with three firms on Salop’s circle. Two of them are
interconnected. I find that the not-interconnected firm is worse off in all the metrics - profits,
market share, and price. This shows that even letting some of the firms in the market to
interconnect might be bad for consumers and for the other firms in the market.
The next section focuses on asymmetric competition - first with one of the firms having
a better product than another, and then with one of the firms getting to the market first,
6See Economides (1996) for more on mix-and-match models and comparison with the network externality
approach. The quote in the text is from that article.
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and having some installed base of consumers by the time the second firm comes in. Both
of the asymmetric cases show that prices go up after interconnection. More dimensions of
differentiation make interconnection less valuable. Another result is that the market share
of the bigger firm (in either context) is smaller with interconnection. If one naively uses
Herfindahl index to measure competitiveness, the index is smaller if firms interconnect, yet
the firms compete less aggressively and consumers pay higher prices.
The last section is a look at what happens in a not covered market. I use (a slightly
modified) spokes model of Chen and Riordan (2007) to examine the uncovered market case.
The main result of a post-interconnection decrease in consumer welfare still holds in this
setup. However, the possibility of bringing in more consumers to the market mitigates the
effect of the existing consumers becoming less elastic.
2 Interconnection in a Covered Market
On the demand side I follow the setup of Farrell and Saloner (1992), without adapters, or
Spulber (2008b); but generalizing to N firms on a circle, with general externality function
g, and a general travel cost function h. Consumers are distributed uniformly along a circle
of circumference M and N firms are also located on the circle, at equal distances from each
other. A consumer x away from a firm receives utility of
g(ne)− h(x)− p, (1)
where ne is the expected number of consumers buying from this firm, and p is the price.
Assume g(0) is big enough so that every consumer buys a product, and that travel cost are
steep enough, h′(t) > g′(2t) > 0. Firms may choose to interconnect before the market opens.
This is a joint decision - each firms needs to prefer to interconnect for this to happen. Each
firm has to pay F > 0 to interconnect. If the firms do interconnect, then consumers perceive
all the goods as being part of the same network, and therefore instead of g(ne) all consumers
receive g(M) after purchasing the product.
Proposition 1 In a symmetric equilibrium without interconnection firms charge
p =
M
N
(
h′(
M
2N
)− g′(M
N
)
)
. (2)
Proof. I focus on the consumer indifferent between joining two firms given the prices. Fix
the prices of all firms but one at p. Then the shares of all the firms, except the two adjacent
to the potential deviant firm, are M
N
. The two firms bordering the deviant are going to have
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demand of M
2N
on the side not bordering the deviant’s market. Then, the consumer at x
who is indifferent between the deviant, whose price is p, and another firm, whose price is
p, is defined by7. The sufficiently high product differentiation makes the standard in the
literature problem of expected equilibria much easier. If the consumer at .5 joins the firm at
0 as opposed to joining the firm at 1, then so does the consumer at .4. Therefore, just like
in any Hotelling-based setup we just have to find the indifferent consumer at x. This point
was made by Anderson et.al. (1992).
g(x + ne)− h(x)− p = g(3M
2N
− x)− h( M
2N
− x)− p, (3)
where ne is the expected number of consumers buying from the deviant firm on the other side
(not x’s side). The deviant firm’s profit is Π = 2xp, and therefore the first order condition is
x + p
dx
dp
= 0 (4)
Implicitly differentiating 3 with respect to p, we get
dx
dp
=
1
g′(x + ne) + g′(3M
2N
− x)− h′(x)− h′( M
2N
− x) (5)
Substituting this result into 4 and invoking the symmetry condition (ne = x = M
2N
from
p = p), we get the result in the proposition. We also need to take care of the second order
conditions. The second derivate of profit with respect to price is 2dx
dp
+ pd
2x
dp2
. The first term
is negative if h′(t) > g′(2t) for t > 0, and the second term is negative if h′′(t) > g′′(2t), and
is zero in a symmetric equilibrium.
The social welfare effects of interconnection are the increase in the network external-
ity benefits to consumers and the sunk costs paid by the firms. The price difference does
not matter for the social welfare, since this is simply a transfer from consumers to firms.
However, firms interconnect only if the price difference is big enough to cover the (sunk)
costs of interconnection. Therefore, the price difference might be sufficiently large for the
interconnection to happen, but the network externalities might be too small to justify inter-
connection from the social perspective. In this case, the consumers suffer as well, since they
are the ones paying for interconnection costs.
If the firms choose to interconnect, then the sunk cost to interconnect, F, does not matter
for pricing decision. The difference on the demand side is that it does not matter how many
7Assuming that the inactive firm grabs M2N of the market from the other side. Different assumptions
would lead to different SOCs (i.e. h′(t) > g′(t) instead of h′(t) > g′(2t))
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other consumers buy the same product - in the end, everyone derives externalities from
the joint network. Therefore, consumers’ utility from network externalities does not enter
firms’ pricing decision either, and the firms price at p = M
N
h′( M
2N
) (Salop (1979) price with
generalized travel cost function, can be derived using similar arguments as the proof for the
previous proposition). Since the market share is the same in each symmetric equilibrium,
M
N
, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 If the firms decide to interconnect, price increases by M
N
g′(M
N
). Firms inter-
connect (profits increase by more than the costs of interconnection) if and only if(
M
N
)2
g′(
M
N
) > F. (6)
Since the price increase depends on g′ and consumer welfare depends on g, consumer welfare
might decrease after interconnection, unlike in Katz and Shapiro(1985). This result imme-
diately leads to re-examination of their central result that firms do not interconnect enough
because consumer welfare effect is always positive8. Two following corollaries classify the
parameter values and outcomes when firms interconnect.
Corollary 2 Firms interconnect when it is socially optimal to, if and only if F is small
enough that
min
(
(
M
N
)2g′(
M
N
),
M
N
(g(M)− g(M
N
))
)
> F. (7)
Firms interconnect when it is NOT socially optimal to if
(
M
N
)2g′(
M
N
) > F >
M
N
(g(M)− g(M
N
)). (8)
With interconnection, consumer welfare increases if and only if
M
N
g′(
M
N
) < g(M)− g(M
N
). (9)
In particular, it always decreases if the interconnection was not beneficial to the society.
For firms to interconnect when it is not socially optimal, the externality function g needs to
be sufficiently steep. This means that firms interconnect too much exactly when consumers’
enjoyment of the product rises too fast with the number of other consumers joining the
network.
8∆SW = ∆CW + ∆Π. In Katz and Shapiro ∆CW > 0, and therefore ∆Π < ∆SW , and in particular
it is possible that ∆Π < F < ∆SW , where F is the cost of interconnection, and in this case it it socially
optimal to interconnect, but the firms do not want to.
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Some (arguably most) products exhibit the properties that the network effects are in-
creasing sharply in the number of users up to some point, and then they start to flatten
out or decrease. The result of firms interconnecting too much is particularly relevant for
these products. If the turning point is at a bigger number of consumers then any one one
product enjoys in a symmetric equilibrium, then g′(M
N
) is relatively large, so that the firms
interconnect, however the difference in consumer utility between the big network and a small
network (g(M)− g(M
N
)) is much smaller since g(M) is an overkill as far as the network size
is concerned.
3 Product Positioning with Network Effects
Product positioning with networks had been neglected in the literature, at least partially
stemming from the lack of models on horizontally differentiated networks. In this section
I develop a simple model of product positioning with network effects, and examine what
happens when firms have the ability to interconnect.
The model’s only departure from Hotelling (1929) is the addition of network effects
into the mix and quadratic travel cost to ensure an equilibrium (see d’Aspremont et. al.
1979). Consumers’ preferred points are distributed uniformly on the unit interval. If the
product is distance d away from a consumer’s preferred point, consumer derives utility of
R − td2 − p + jne, where R is the reservation utility, t is the travel cost or differentiation
parameter, p is the price of the product, j is the strength of network effects, and ne is the
expected number of consumers joining the network. The first(second) firm is located a(b)
away 0(1). With j = 0 this is exactly the model in d’Aspremont et. al. (1979).
Proposition 2 With network effects the firm closer to 0 charges
p0 =
t
3
((b− 2)2 − (a + 1)2)− j. (10)
Proof. See Appendix.
As expected, the stronger the network effects are, the lower is the price. With intercon-
nection, the price is the same as in d’Aspremont et.al. - the same as above with j = 0. The
price increases both as the firm gets closer to its own end (i.e. as a gets smaller), and the
farther away the competitor is (i.e. as b gets smaller).
Proposition 3 The incentive to move farther from the competitor decreases in the strength
of network effects (∂
2Π0
∂a∂j
< 0) when the firms are moderate distance away, and increases
(∂
2Π0
∂a∂j
> 0) either when the firms are close or really far.
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Proof. See Appendix.
The strength of network externalities effects demand elasticity in two ways. First, it
effects the demand elasticity directly through the term related to the price difference between
the two firms. Second, it enters indirectly because of the firms having the installed bases of
a and b respectively, so the higher are a and b, the more effect the indirect term has. Hence,
we have the non-monotonic behavior described above.
4 Partial and Sequential Interconnection
Some industries are fully interconnected, some are fully not interconnected and in some
industries one company is interconnected with another, but not with a third one. An example
would be the airline miles points networks - United is interconnected with Lufthansa, but not
with American Airlines. Another one would be instant messengers, where Yahoo! Instant
Messenger became interconnected with Google’s after the recent deal. To focus on the
interesting issues, and to keep the model as tractable as possible, there are three firms in
the market. The market is a Salop’s circle, where unit demand customers are distributed
uniformly with mass 1, and have linear transportation cost t, and linear network benefit j.
I continute to assume that t > 2j and that the market is covered (each consumer buys a
unit). The three firms are located at equal distances from each other, and two of them are
interconnected. I drop the subscript for one of the interconnected firms, denote the other by
subscript o, and the stand-alone firm by s. Since the two interconnected firms are symmetric,
the proof of the following proposition only involves solving a system of two equations with
two variables9.
Fix an interconnected firm (The Firm from now on - the one without the subscript).
The Firm charges one price, but has two different submarkets, on either side of The Firm.
Both of the interconnected firms’ networks include everything not in the stand-alone firm’s
network, but they still fight for consumers between them - with x consumers in the arc
between the two interconnected firms buying from The Firm, and 1
3
− x buying from the
other firm. Similarly, xs consumers buy from The Firm in the arc between The Firm and
the stand-alone firm; and xso consumers buying from the interconnected firm.
Proposition 4 The interconnected firms charge
p =
t− j
3(5t2 − 9tj + 3j2)t(5t− 6j), (11)
9Equations are the first order conditions of an interconnected firm and the stand alone firm, and the
variables are the respective prices.
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Figure 1: Partial Interconnection.
and the stand-alone firm charges
ps =
t− j
3(5t2 − 9tj + 3j2)
(
5t2 − 10tj + 3j2) . (12)
Proof. See Appendix.
Since t > j, simple corollary follows.
Corollary 3 In equilibrium, the stand-alone firm
• charges less than the interconnected firms (ps < p),
• sells less quantity than either of the interconnected firms (Ds < 13),
• derives less profits than either of the interconnected firms (Πs < Π).
In the standard Cournot model cooperation between two of the many firms leads to reduced
output on the part of the cooperating firms, and therefore more profits for the not cooperating
firms. The similar exercise is much harder to reproduce in the Salop’s model, since one needs
to take into account the fact that all the firms are not symmetric anymore - the firms closer
to the cooperating firms are different than the firms farther away10.
10See Giraud-Heraud (2003) for an elegant solution of the case where cooperating firms are neighbors,
with a system of N equations. Another way to model this would be to use the spokes model of Chen and
Riordan (2007), as it would cut down on the number of equations in the system, since the interconnected
firms would be symmetric, and so would be the not interconnected firms.
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The results above show that similar logic holds for partial network interconnection. While
it is not a merger, it is a form of cooperation, and one would expect cooperating firms to
benefit at the expense of the other firm11. The results from Section 2 generalize to here -
sometimes it is not optimal to let even some of the firms in the market interconnect, even if
the ownership stays in different hands.
Corollary 4 If all the firms interconnect, prices are even higher than with only two firms
interconnecting.
Proof. From the previous proposition we have to show that p < t
3
, where the right hand
side of the inequality is the familiar Salop price with three firms. The price of the two
interconnected firms already contains t
3
, and one can see that the prices with all the firms
interconnecting are higher as long as 2t > 3j, which is satisfied because of the t > 2j
assumption.
As expected, the prices in the market go up even more if the third firm joins the network.
From the previous corollary one can easily see that if this happens the original members
of the wide network lose market share. Therefore, for the first two firms to let the third
firm join in, the price increase must be dramatic enough to cover not only for the costs of
interconnection, but also for the market share decrease. Sequential (versus simultaneous)
nature of interconnection does not influence the main result - consumers end up paying more,
and firms might interconnect too much from the social and the consumer welfare points of
view.
5 Effects of Asymmetry on Interconnection Decision
5.1 Different Quality - Vertical Differentiation Together With Hor-
izontal
The ongoing assumption in the paper so far had been that the products are just horizontally
differentiated. Another issue to examine is what happens if there are also quality differences
between the products. There are two firms, located at 0 and M of the Hotelling interval
[0,M], with consumers distributed uniformly. Assume that both h and g (the travel cost
and the network externality functions) are linear, with coefficients of, respectively, t and j.
Also, without loss of generality, assume that all the consumers derive an additional utility
of Q > 0 from consuming firm 0’s product.
11Again, because we are dealing with the Hotelling setup here. In Cournot mergers the firms that do not
merge benefit more.
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Proposition 5 With quality differences, both firms are less willing to interconnect. If the
firms do interconnect, prices increase and market concentration decreases.
Proof. The indifferent consumer is at x which is defined by
2x =
p2 − p1
t− j +
Q
t− j + M, (13)
with subscript 2 denoting the firm at M, subscript 1 denoting the firm at 0 (the one with the
superior product). The only difference from the familiar formula is the fraction with Q, and
as one would expect, setting Q = 0 gives us back the standard formula. From 13 and the
first order conditions for each firm we can get the following system describing the optimal
prices:
p1 =
p2
2
+
Q
2
+ (t− j)M
2
(14a)
p2 =
p1
2
− Q
2
+ (t− j)M
2
(14b)
The difference is the vertical Q term, which makes the firms asymmetrical, as expected.
Solving the system, we get
p∗1 = M(t− j) +
Q
3
(15a)
p∗2 = M(t− j)−
Q
3
, (15b)
and from there, x∗ = M
2
+ Q
6(t−j) . The prices and the indifferent consumer above give us
the profits of the firms before interconnection. Firm 1’s profit is xp1 and firm 2’s profit
is (M − x)p2. After interconnection the profits are the before interconnection profits with
j = 0. The difference between pre- and post-interconnection profits for both firms is
Π∆ =
M2j
2
− j
18t(t− j) ×Q
2, (16)
note that Q enters with a negative sign - for both firms the higher the quality difference is,
the less they are willing to spend on interconnection.
Quality differences introduce another dimension of differentiation into the setup, allowing
the firms to derive higher profits than otherwise. Interconnection still means that firms do
not compete for consumers as aggressively as before, however this is not as valuable since
the firms are already differentiated in two dimensions, as firms do not compete on prices as
hard to begin with. Both firms are less willing to interconnect in this setup. For both of
12
them the extra dimension of differentiation brings in more profits, and the interconnection
is not as enticing. The result is likely to generalize to more dimensions than two - the more
dimensions the firms are differentiated on, the less incentive they have to interconnect.
5.2 Previous Installed Base - Competing With Incumbent
We have looked at the quality asymmetry in the previous subsection. Now, assume that the
quality of the products is the same, but one of the firms is a new entrant, with the other
already having some consumers captured.
There are two firms, located at 0 and 1 of the Hotelling interval [0, 1], with consumers
distributed uniformly. Assume that both h and g (the travel cost and the network externality
functions) are linear, with coefficients of, respectively, t and j, with t > 2j. Also, without loss
of generality, assume that the firm at 0 already has A consumers captured from the previous
periods. Suppose that these A consumers are going to stay with their firm no matter what,
but the firm cannot charge different prices to the old and to the new consumers. I denote
the firm with an installed base by subscript a, and the other firm by subscript b.
Proposition 6 The bigger the installed base is, the more the firms want to interconnect. If
the firms do interconnect, prices increase and market share of the bigger firm decreases.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one for the previous proposition, and therefore relegated
to the appendix.
Here we have the opposite result from the quality competition. The reason is that
while the firms were differentiated in quality in the example before, there were no captured
consumers. In this example, there is a captured installed base at the incumbent’s disposal.
This base is not under a threat from the entrant, and therefore the bigger the installed base
is, the more the incumbent is interested in higher prices which come after interconnection.
The entrant is not going to get the installed base one way or another, but with the incumbent
becoming softer as the installed base grows, the entrant has more market share and a higher
price charged to gain as the two firms interconnect.
6 Not Covered Market
In format (or standard) wars many consumers sit out and wait for either one of the standards
to emerge as the winner, or for the firms to agree on a common standard. For example,
some of the consumers would have been in the market for a high definition DVD equipment
much sooner if there would have been an established standard from the beginning. From the
13
Figure 2: Spokes and Network Effects.
theoretical perspective, one of the reasons that the consumer welfare always increases in Katz
and Shapiro (1985) is that there are more consumers buying products after interconnection,
which is not the case in any of the previous sections.
I tweak the model from above to address this issue. I use a slightly modified version of
the spokes model of Chen and Riordan (2007) with two firms and three spokes12. The spoke
setup is represented in Figure 2. I chose this set up since the spokes model is also non-local
competition, just like the Cournot model, but unlike Hotelling or Salop. It does not matter
for this special case, however extending to more firms than two should be easier from this
groundwork.
The consumers are distributed uniformly along three spokes coming out of one hub, call
them spoke 0, 1, and 2. Each spoke is of length 1. The two firms are located at the end of
spokes 1 and 2, and I refer to them as, respectively, firm 1 and firm 2. Each consumer can
only buy a product from two of the spokes - the spoke that the consumer is on, and one of
the other ones with equal probability (in this case .5). If there is no product on one of those
spokes (spoke 0 here), then the consumer is choosing between buying the product on the
other spoke, or not buying the product at all.
This results in three submarkets. One of the submarkets is the standard Hotelling com-
petition between firm 1 and firm 2, and this submarket consists of a (random) half of the
consumers on spokes 1 and 2. I call this submarket 12 from now on. The other two submar-
kets are standard Hotelling monopoly setups, and consist of the other half of the consumers
at spoke 1 and half of the consumers at spoke 0 for firm 1’s monopoly submarket (call this
submarket 10); and of the other half of the consumers at spoke 2 and the other half of the
consumers at spoke 0 for firm 2’s monopoly submarket (call this submarket 20). The trans-
portation costs are linear with the parameter t, network effects are linear with the parameter
12In what follows, the setup is equivalent to Hotelling with hinterlands - two firms located at 0 and 1, and
consumers distributed along [a,b], with [0, 1] ∈ [a, b].
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j, as usual t > 2j, and each spoke has a weight of 1 of consumers. The modification of the
spokes model is that I make spoke 0 into a ray. I am not interested in what happens if the
market is covered, since I have examined this case in detail in the sections above, therefore
with a ray instead of the 0 spoke there is always additional demand if the firms interconnect.
I assume that the weight on each 1 unit of the ray is the same as the weight on either of
the two spokes, so the total size of the market is infinity. Submarket 12 (the competition
submarket) only has a size of 1 (half of spoke 1 and half of spoke 2). The consumer utilities
are as in the sections before.
Note that the ray instead of a spoke assumption stacks the model in favor of the result
of always too little interconnection. The firms have a much lower incentive of increasing
prices, since there is a huge incentive of lowering prices to attract more consumers from
the ray. Moreover, with interconnection the firms play a non-cooperative game in the small
submarket 12 competing for consumers, however they are interested in cooperating on the
(heavier weighted) ray, since more consumers for my rival means that the value of my product
goes up for my monopoly market and I can get more revenue, all of which would imply strong
incentives to keep prices down post interconnection.
Proposition 7 With sufficiently high product differentiation or sufficiently low network ef-
fects, the prices go up with interconnection and consumer welfare suffers, resulting in the
possibility of too much interconnection.
Proof. While the logic of the proofs stays roughly the same, the algebra becomes much
more involved. First, I find the equilibrium prices without interconnection. For that I need
to find demand of the firms in each of the submarkets. The competitive submarket (12)
can be characterized by the following, where x12 is how far away from firm 1 the consumer
indifferent between buying from firm 1 and from firm 2 is located.
−p1 − tx12 + j x12 + x10
2
= −p2 − t(2− x12) + j 2− x12 + x20
2
, (17)
where p’s are the prices, x10 and x20 are consumers on the ray (spoke 0) who, respectively,
are indifferent between buying firm 1’s product and not buying at all and buying firm 2’s
product and not buying at all. We have to divide the demand by 2 for network effects, since
only half of the consumers before (for example) x12 are in the competitive submarket, the
rest are in one of the monopoly submarkets. Similarly, we can characterize the other two
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x’s:
R− p1 − tx10 + j x12 + x10
2
= 0, (18a)
R− p2 − tx20 + j 2− x12 + x20
2
= 0. (18b)
From the definitions of x’s ((17),(18a), and (18b)), we have a system of three equations with
three variables (the x’s). Solving the system, we get:
x12 = 1 +
p2 − p1
2(t− j) , (19a)
x10 =
2R + j
2t− j +
3jp1 + jp2 − 4tp1
2(t− j)(2t− j) . (19b)
The profit function of firm 1 is (multiplied by 2 for convenience)
Π1 = p1(x10 + x12), (20)
differentiating with respect to p1, we get:
∂Π1
∂p1
= 1 +
p2 − 2p1
2(t− j) +
2R + j
2t− j +
6jp1 + jp2 − 8tp1
2(t− j)(2t− j) , (21)
The second order condition holds, so setting the expression above to zero and invoking the
symmetry conditions we get
p∗ =
2(t− j)(R + t)
5t− 4j . (22)
Now we need to find the equilibrium prices with interconnection. It used to be that the
intensity of network effects would not matter with interconnection. This is not the case
now. While it will not matter (directly) for the competitive submarket, j directly effects the
monopoly submarkets, since the higher the strength of the network effects, and the bigger the
network, the more consumers prefer to purchase from their monopolist than not to purchase
at all. Therefore the new equations which define the x’s are going to be the same for the
monopoly submarkets (x10 and x20), and the previous equation (17) with j set to 0 for the
competitive submarket (x12). Solving this new system we get:
x12 = 1 +
p2 − p1
2t
, (23a)
x10 =
R + j
t− j −
p1
t− j +
p1 − p2
2t(t− j) . (23b)
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Given the new values, and differentiating the same profit function, we get
∂Π1
∂p1
= 1 +
p2 − 2p1
2t
+
R + j
t− j −
2p1
t− j +
2p1 − p2
2t(t− j) , (24a)
∂2Π1
∂p21
=
1
t
− 2
t− j +
1
t(t− j) . (24b)
The second order condition is satisfied iff 3t > j + 1 and I assume it for the rest of the
discussion. Involving the usual symmetry conditions the FOC gives us
p∗ =
2t(R + t)
5t− j − 1 . (25)
Prices after interconnection are higher for sufficiently high product differentiation (t). The
change in consumer welfare (consumer welfare with interconnection less the consumer welfare
without interconnection) is (with superscript i denoting interconnection, and superscript n
denoting no interconnection):
CW i−CW n = [pi − pn + 2j(xi10 − xn10)] (1+2xn10)+(xi10−xn10) [R + j(1 + 2xi10)− pi]−2t∫ xi10
xn10
zdz,
(26)
where all the x’s and p’s are the equilibrium values. The first term is how the welfare of
existing consumers changed. The second term is the welfare of the new consumers, who did
not buy before interconnection. The third term is the travel cost that the new consumers
have to pay. The sum of the last two terms is positive, otherwise the new consumers would
not buy. The first term is negative as long as the prices go up with interconnection. Overall,
apriori it is not clear what happens. Note however that all the positive terms decrease with
t, and the travel cost increases with t. Since all of our restrictions on the shapes of the
travel cost and network effect functions involved t being sufficiently high, this means that a
sufficiently large t still satisfies those restrictions, and makes the expression above negative.
By previous arguments this implies that firms might interconnect too much.
Even with the model stacked against a decrease in consumer welfare, I still get the result
of too much interconnection with sufficiently high product differentiation. The possiblity of
market expansion mitigates the results of an automatic post-interconnection price increase,
but high enough product differentiation still delivers a result similar to the ones from previous
sections.
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7 Conclusion
I have examined the base aspects of differentiated Bertrand competition with the presence
of network externalities and the option to interconnect. I have started with showing that
the seminal result of not enough interconnection does not hold. When the network exter-
nality function is steep enough, then both consumer and social welfare suffer when firms
interconnect, and therefore there might be too much interconnection, paradoxically, when
the externality increases too fast. The effect comes from the fact that steep network ex-
ternality function implies high demand elasticity, and the inability by firms to charge high
prices. However, after interconnection the elasticity goes down, and the steeper the exter-
nality function, the less elastic demand becomes, since consumers do not care about which
firm to join as far as the networks effects are concerned - they just care about the price.
I find that the results hold up with sequential interconnection in a three-firm market
(first two firms interconnect between themselves, and then they might or might not let the
third firm enter). The results also do not change qualitatively with either quality differences
between the firms, or one of the firms having an installed base. Other comparative statics
in these results are interesting in their own right.
The asymmetric cases show that the intuition from the symmetic case still holds. More
interesting results are that more dimensions of differentiation make interconnection less valu-
able - firms are already not competing that hard on prices without interconnection. However,
an incumbent with an installed base values interconnection more than firms in the symmetric
case. Interconnection allows both the incumbent and the entrant not to compete as much
on prices, and while incumbent might not gain as many new consumers as without intercon-
nection, the increased price margin more than makes up for the loss. In both asymmetric
cases (one product better than another, and one firm having captured consumers) with in-
terconnection the Herfindahl index is lower, while the firms are competing less aggressively,
indicating that with network interconnections naively using the index might lead to wrong
conclusions.
The results from Bertrand differentiation are qualitatively different from the standard
(Katz and Shapiro (1985)) Cournot-based approach to network externalities, and give dif-
ferent intuition to the effects of network externality. And as in general, one should think
carefully whether the competition is Cournot or differentiated Bertrand, even in the case of
network externalities.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Call the firm at a’s price p0, and the other firm’s price p1. There is a marginal
consumer at some x, who is indifferent between joining either of the networks. A nice
feature of the Hotelling setup is there is a natural division of which consumer belongs to
which network - all the consumers with preferred points to the left of the marginal consumer
buy the product to the left, and the consumers to the right buy the other product13. This
means that for the left firm ne = x, where x is the marginal consumer. Therefore, the
following equation characterizes x, with the left hand side the utility (without the reservation
value) for the left firm’s product, and the utility from the right firm’s product on the right
hand side.
jx− t(x− a)2 − p0 = j(1− x)− t(1− b− x)2 − p1 (27a)
x =
p1 − p0
2(t(1− a− b)− j) +
t(1 + b2 − a2 − 2b)− j
2(t(1− a− b)− j) (27b)
Profit of the firm on the left is Π0 = p0x. Differentiating it with respect to p0, and deriving
a similar condition for the firm of the right, we get the following system of two equations
with two variables (p0 and p1):
p1 − 2p0
2(t(1− a− b)− j) +
t(1 + b2 − a2 − 2b)− j
2(t(1− a− b)− j) = 0 (28a)
p0 − 2p1
2(t(1− a− b)− j) + 1−
t(1 + b2 − a2 − 2b)− j
2(t(1− a− b)− j) = 0 (28b)
From the system, the price of the left firm is as stated in the proposition (switch a and b to
get the right firm’s price).
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. From the proof directly above, we know both the demand (x) and the optimal price
(p0) given a, b, and j. From d’Aspremont et. al., we know that
∂Π0
∂a
< 0, or that profits
increase as the firm moves away from the center. I am interested in the effects of j on
both magnitude and sign of the incentives to agglomerate. Therefore, we need ∂
2Π0
∂a∂j
. From
symmetry, we know that p1−p0 = t3(2a2−2b2−2a+2b). Then after substituting the optimal
13Noted by Anderson et. al. (1992), p.259
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prices:
x(a, b) =
t(b2 − a2 − 2a− 4b + 3)− j
6(t(1− b− a)− j) , (29a)
dx
da
= t
t(1− a− b)2 + 2aj + j
6(t(1− b− a)− j)2 , (29b)
dx
dj
= t
b2 − a2 − a− 3b + 2
6(t(1− b− a)− j)2 , (29c)
d2x
dadj
= t
t(3− 2b)(1− a− b) + 2aj + j
6(t(1− b− a)− j)3 . (29d)
It is possible (but tedious) to show then, that
∂2Π0
∂a∂j
=
t3(1− a− b) [2a3 − 2b3 + 2a2b− 2ab2 + 6ab + 6b2 − 3a2 − 12a− 6b + 2]
6(t(1− b− a)− j)2 (30a)
+
jt2 [−4a3 + 4ab2 + a2 − 8ab + 10a + 2b− 2]
6(t(1− b− a)− j)2 . (30b)
For simplicity, I examine the symmetric cases, where a=b. It is (relatively) easy to see that
with a, b → 0 the first term is positive, and the second one is negative, however since we
assume that t > j throughout the text, the whole expression is positive. As a and b move
away from 0, the first term decreases, and the second term becomes positive, first moving into
overall negative, and then becoming positive before a = .5. The less j is with respect to t, the
bigger a it takes to go into the negative, and the bigger b it takes to become positive again.
In the limit, as j → 0, the derivative is positive when a < 1 −
√
7
3
, which is approximately
.12. As j → t, the derivative is positive when a < 19−
√
181
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, which is approximately .31.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The demand in the first submarket, where the competition is the other intercon-
nected firm, is the standard Salop/Hotelling demand, since from the previous sections we
know that interconnected firms compete like standard product differentiated firms.
x =
1
6
+
po − p
2t
, (31)
where po is the price of the other interconnected firm, and
1
6
comes from the fact that there
are three submarkets overall (each of size 1
3
), and if the firms are exactly the same, they split
the submarket equally. The Firm competes with the stand-alone firm in the other submarket,
and here we need to consider that the firms might potentially have different sized networks,
and add the size of the other interconnected firm’s network. Therefore, with utility from
buying The Firm on the left hand side, and the utility from buying from the stand-alone
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firm on the right hand side, we get:
−p− txs + j(xs + 1
3
+ xso) = −ps − t(1
3
− xs) + j(2
3
− xs − xso). (32)
The term by j on the left hand side is the size of the interconnected network - what The
Firm takes from the stand-alone firm, the arc between the interconnected firms, and what
the other interconnected firm takes from the stand-alone firm. The similar expression on the
other side is just the remainder (1 minus the expression on the left hand side). From this
equation we get
xs =
1
6
+
ps − p
2(t− j) +
jxso
t− j . (33)
The demands for The Firm and the stand-alone firm respectively are D = x + xs and
Ds =
2
3
− xs − xso. Differentiating profit of The Firm with respect to own price, and
substituting from previous equations we get
∂Π
∂p
=
1
3
+
po − 2p
2t
+
ps − 2p
2(t− j) +
jxso
t− j . (34)
It is clear that the second order conditions are satisfied. We do not know xso, however in
equilibrium the two interconnected firms are symmetric, and therefore xso = xs, and po = p.
Substituting that into 33 we get
xso =
ps − p
2(t− j) +
t− j
6(t− 2j) . (35)
Then the first order condition for The Firm (plugging the right hand side above into 34 and
making it equal to 0) gives us
t(t− j)(2t− 3j)− 3p(3t2 − 6jt + 2j2) + 3pst(t− j) = 0. (36)
The FOC from the stand-alone firm gives
ps =
t− j
3(2t− 3j)(t− 3j + 3p). (37)
This with equation 36 gives a system of two equations with two variables. The answers are
in the proposition statement.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. As before, we have to see where is the indifferent consumer located, and she is
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located at x, where x satisfies the following equation
2x =
pb − pa
t− j +
Aj
t− j + 1. (38)
Therefore, bigger firm’s demand is A + x, and the smaller firm’s demand is 1 − x, where x
is defined above. The profits are then, respectively, (A + x)pa and (1 − x)pb. From this we
get the following first order conditions:
2(A + x)− pa
t− j = 0, (39a)
2(1− x)− pb
t− j = 0. (39b)
Since t > 2j, the second order conditions are satisfied for both firms, and we just have to
solve a system of three equations and three variables, with the third one being 38. Skipping
(quite a few) steps, we have the following results:
p∗a =
4
3
At + (t− j)− Aj, (40a)
p∗b =
2
3
At + (t− j)− Aj, (40b)
x∗ =
1
2
− A
3
+
Aj
6(t− j) . (40c)
Since x∗ increases monotonically with j, and both prices decrease monotonically with j, we
get the second part of the proposition (as before, the prices and market shares are going to
be determined by the same equations with j = 0). The less trivial part are the incentives
to interconnect. After plugging in profits after interconnection and subtracting the profits
from before, we get the following differences in profits:
Π∆a = Π
∆
b = Aj +
j
2
+
jA2
2
− tjA
2
18(t− j) . (41)
Since t > 2j, the expression above increases in A - the bigger the installed base is, the more
the firms want to interconnect, giving us the first part of the proposition.
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